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.TAMES WILSON NICHOLS, Appellant, v. ROY GILBERT 
McCOY, Respondent. 
[1] Appeal-Objections-Evidence.-Objection that record of cor-
oner's office was proved by allowing head toxicologist for 
coroner to testify to its contents rather than by introducing 
the paper itself in evidence is too late when made for the 
first time on appeal. 
[2a, 2b] Evidence-Documentary Evidence-Coroner's Record.-
In action against motorist for wrongful death of pedestrian, 
coroner's record that test made of decedent's blood indicated 
the presence of alcohol is admissible under the Uniform Busi-
ness Records as Evidence Act (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1953e-
1953h), where sufficient foundation for a ruling that blood 
tested was decedent's was laid by evidence that, as part of 
regular operation of coroner's office, blood samples were col-
lected from undertakers for purpose of analysis; that an 
analysis was made from a sample taken from a bottle bearing 
decedent's name; that the embalmer took the sample before 
embalming the body, labeled thE' bottle, and left it for an em-
ployee of the coroner to pick up; that he took the sample from 
the only body in the mortuary to which decedent's daughter-
in-law testified his body had been taken; and that he was 
informed of decedent's name at time of embalming and again 
the next day when his employer had him sign the embalming 
certificate, it not being necessary that he have personal knowl-
edge of the identity of decedent. 
[3] Id.- Documentary Evidence- Business Records.-Object of 
business records statutes is to eliminate the necessity of calling 
each witness and to substitute the record of the transaction 
or event. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
.Angeles County. J . .A. Smith, Judge.* .Affirmed . 
.Action for damages for wrongful death. Judgment for de-
fendant affirmed. 
[3] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr. Supp., Evidence, § 178; Am.Jur., Evi-
dence, § 1043. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error,§ 168; [2, 3] Evi-
dence, § 326.1. 
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
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R.oyal M. Galvin and Daniel Schnabel for Appellant. 
Bauder, Gilbert, 'l'hompson, Kelly & Veatch and Henry F. 
Walker for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff brought this action for the wrong-
ful death of his father, who was struck and killed by defend-
ant's automobile while attempting to cross San Fernando Road 
on foot. The accident occurred in the early evening at or 
near a poorly lighted pedestrian crosswalk. There was evi-
dence from which the jury could infer that defendant was 
negligent in failing to yield the right of way to decedent or 
in failing to observe him crossing the highway until the mo-
ment of impact. There was a conflict in the evidence as to 
whether or not decedent was in the crosswalk, and the jury 
could infer that he was negligent in walking or running into 
the path of defendant's automobile. The jury returned a 
verdict for defendant upon which judgment was entered, and 
plaintiff has appealed. 
Plaintiff's only contention is that the trial court erred in 
allowing the head toxicologist of the Los Angeles County 
coroner's office to testify to the contents of an official record of 
his office. The record stated that a test made of the blood of 
decedent indicated the presence of 0.11 per cent alcohol. 
[1] Plaintiff made no objection in the trial court to the fact 
that the record was proved by allowing the witness to testify to 
its contents rather than by introducing the paper itself in evi-
dence, and accordingly, it is now too late to object to the man-
ner in which the evidence of the record was presented. (Estate 
of Huston, 163 Cal.166, 173 [124P. 852].) Plaintiff contends, 
however, that it was prejudicially erroneous to admit the re-
sults of the test in evidence, on the ground that there was 
no proof that the blood tested was that of decedent. (See 
People v. Smith, 55 Cal.App. 324, 327 [203 P. 816]; American 
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Ind1~stria.l Ace. Com., 78 Cal.App.2d 
493, 496-497 [178 P.2d 40] .) Defendant, on the other hand, 
contends that under sections 1920 and1953e-1953h of the Code 
of Civil Procedure, the record of the coroner's office was ad-
missible to prove all the facts stated therein, including the 
source of the blood, and that in any event there was suf-
ficient additional evidence to prove that the blood referred 
to in the coroner's record was that of decedent. 
Since we have concluded that the challenged record was 
admissible under the Uniform Business Records as Evidence 
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Act (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1953e-1953h), it is unnecessary to. 
decide whether it was also admissible under section 1920 of 
the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 1953e provides: ''The 
term 'business' as used in this article shall include every 
kind of business, profession, occupation, calling or operation 
of institutions, whether carried on for profit or not.'' Sec-
tion 1953f provides : ''A record of an act, condition or event, 
shall, in so far as relevant, be competent evidence if the cus-
todian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and 
the mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the reg-
ular course of business, at or near the time of the act, condi-
tion or event, and if, in the opinion of the court, the sources 
of information, method and time of preparation were such 
as to justify its admission." In 111 cGowan v. City of Los An-
geles, 100 Cal.App.2d 386 [223 P.2d 862], it was the opinion 
of the trial court that the sources of information, method and 
time of preparation of the record in question were not such 
as to justify its admission. In that case neither the embalmer 
nor any other witness from the mortuary testified as to the 
procedure followed in taking blood samples, and the trial court 
was therefore justified in concluding that the proper founda-
tion had not been laid. [2a] In the present case, however, 
the trial court concluded that a proper foundation had been 
laid, and the evidence supports this ruling. There was evi-
dence that as part of the regular operation of the coroner's 
office, blood samples were collected from undertakers for the 
purpose of analysis. An analysis was made from a sample 
taken from a bottle bearing decedent's name. The embalmer 
testified that he took the sample before embalming the body, 
labeled the bottle, and left it for an employee of the coroner's 
office to pick up. He was informed of the name of decedent 
at the time of the embalming and again the next day when 
his employer had him sign the embalming certificate. It 
was not necessary that he have personal knowledge of the 
identity of decedent. (Loper v. 111orrison, 23 Cal.2d 600, 
608-609 [ 145 P .2d 1].) The trial court was justified in con-
cluding that the embalmer's sources of information with re-
spect to the identity of decedent were accurate and that he 
would not label a bottle of blood with decedent's name unless 
he were reasonably sure that it was decedent's. (See Health 
& Saf. Code, § 10451.) [3] "It is the object of the business 
records statutes to eliminate the necessity of calling each 
witness, and to substitute the record of the transaction or 
38 C.2d-15 
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event." (Loper v. Mm·rison, supra, 23 Cal.2d 600, 608.) 
· Accordingly, it was unnecessary to call the witness who sup-
plied the embalmer with the information he recorded. 
[2b] Aside, however, from the evidence provided by the 
record itself, there was additional evidence that the blood in 
the bottle labeled with decedent's name was his blood. De-
cedent's daughter-in-law testified that his body was taken to 
the Paschall Mortuary shortly after the accident. The em-
balmer testified that he took a sample of blood from the only 
body in the mortuary that night and labeled it with decedent's 
name. Since decedent's body was in the mortuary, and since 
there was only one body there, it is clear that the sample of 
blood taken was that of decedent. It is immaterial, therefore, 
whether or not the embalmer knew personally the identity 
of decedent. A sufficient foundation was laid to justify the 
trial court's conclusion that the blood tested by the coroner's 
office was decedent's, and accordingly, there was no error in 
admitting the record in evidence. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., con-
C1Irred. 
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-In matters of legal proof which 
directly concern security of life, liberty and property I do 
not like to exchange any portion . of certainty, which at best 
is but relative, for mere convenience, which is unnecessary. 
I would prefer that we concern ourselves more with ad-
vancing standards of authenticity and reliability of evidence, 
and enhancing certainty of proof, rather than with develop-
ing more convenient substitutes for trustworthy evidence and 
complacency in lower standards of certainty. The breaking 
down1 of the safeguards for reliability of evidence which have 
been culled from the accumulated experiences of the civilized 
world in its quest for justice through showing the truth in 
free courts, does not, in my view, make for the security of 
'This case sets one more flagstone in the path departing from estab-
lished standards. Illustrative of the trend see People v. Clapp (1944), 
24 Cal.2d 835, 840 [151 P.2d 237]; People v. Wilson (1944), 25 Cal.2d 
341, 351 [153 P.2d 720]; People v. One 1941 Mercury Sedan (1946), 74 
Cal.App.2d 199, 213 [168 P.2d 443] ; People v. Rochin (1950), 101 Cal. 
App.2d 140, 143, 149 [225 P.2d 1, 913]. But, suggesting a stoppage of 
the trend in its graver impingements on federal constitutional guaran-
ties, see Rochin v. California (1952), 342 U.S. 165 [72 S.Ct. 205, 96 
L.Ed. -]. 
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a free people. 'l'he end, however desirable it might appear 
in individual cases, does not justify the means. 
A sufficient discussion of the reasons for the rule to which 
I think we should adhere is contained in the opinion authored 
by Justice Wood (Parker) for the District Court of Appeal, 
reported at 235 P.2d 412. Upon the grounds stated by Jus-
tice Wood, and emphasized by considerations suggested above, 
I should reverse the judgment. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
I agree with Mr. Justice Schauer that we should be more 
concerned with reliable and accurate evidence than with con-
venient methods of producing it. The holding of the majority 
that the evidence produced in this case, over plaintiff's ob-
jection, was admissible to prove that plaintiff's decedent was 
guilty of contributory negligence, is one of the most flagrant 
examples of judicial sanction of nebulous hearsay that has 
come to my attention. 
Mr. Justice Parker \Vood's excellent opinion, which I adopt 
in full as my dissent in this case, points out that no witness 
who testified had any independent recollection that the official 
county coroner's record, covering the blood analysis in ques-
tion, was based on the blood taken from the decedent. All 
witnesses either assumed that it was, thought it must have 
been, or should have been, or could have been, because that 
body was the only one in the mortuary at that time. Since 
the witnesses who testified had only a "faint" recollection or 
no independent recollection of the taking of the blood sample, 
one is forced to question the statement that decedent's body was 
the only one there at that time. What time~ As Justice Wood 
points out, it did not appear that other bodies were not there 
later that night or at some time during the next two days 
before the pathologist arrived and performed the autopsy. 
While I agree that entries made in the ordinary course of 
business in the records of business establishments should be 
admissible in evidence without calling as witnesses the parties 
making such entries, I can see a vast difference between such 
records and the one introduced in evidence in the case at bar. 
The entry in the business record is made at the time the 
transaction is consummated and, if properly made, discloses 
the nature of the transaction by indicating what was done 
and when and how it was done. Such a record, if made in 
the' ordinary course of business, carries a presumption of reg-
452 NrcnoLs v. McCoY [38 C.2d 
ularity and accuracy, while here the possibility of error is so 
great as to completely destroy its probative value. 
I quote with approval the opinion prepared by Mr. Justice 
Parker Wood, which was concurred in by Presiding Justice 
Shinn and Associate Justice Vallee, when this case was before 
the District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Three, 
( 235 P .2d 412-16) which correctly states the facts and de-
clares the law in accordance with what has been the rule of 
decision in this state: 
''Action for damag·es for the wrongful death of William 
Allen Nichols, a pedestrian, resulting from the alleged negli-
gence of defendant in operating an automobile. Plaintifl' is 
the son and only heir of the deceased. In a trial by jury the 
verdict was for defendant, and the judgment was entered in 
accordance with the verdict. Plaintiff appeals from the judg-
ment and from the order denying his motion for a new trial. 
''Appellant contends that the trial court erred in receiving 
the testimony of R. J. Abernathy concerning the alcoholic 
content of a blood specimen. Appellant asserts that the speci-
men of blood was not properly identified as the blood of the 
deceased. 
''The accident occurred about 7 p. m., on December 25, 1948, 
on San Fernando Road near the intersection of Arvilla Street 
which is outside a business or a residential district; San Fer-
nando Road is a paved highway which extends in a northerly 
and southerly direction; San Fernando Road, at and near the 
scene of the accident, is approximately 51 feet wide, and has 
four marked traffic lanes-two for northbound traffic and two 
for southbound traffic; a pedestrian crosswalk extends across 
San Fernando Road near and north of that intersection; the 
crosswalk is 17 feet wide and is marked by white lines about 
12 inches wide. There were no traffic control signals at the 
intersection to regulate traffic on San Fernando Road, and 
the intersection was 'poorly lighted.' 
''On the night of the accident defendant was driving a 1936 
Bnick automobile in a northerly direction on San Fernando 
Road. A.fter he had passed the above-mentioned intersection, 
the automobile he was driving struck Mr. William Allen 
Nichols, a pedestrian 68 years of age, who was proceeding 
across San "B'ernando Road. Mr. Nichols was taken by ambu-
lance to the Van Nuys Receiving Hospital, and he died as 
a result of being strudr by the automobile. 
''Defendant testified that he was driving about 30 miles 
an hour; his automobile was in the lane next to the center 
Feb.l952] NrcnoLs v. McCoY 
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of the highway; traffic proceeding in the opposite direction 
on the highway was quite heavy and some of the lights were 
bright; the headlights of his automobile were in good working 
order and they were burning; he believes he could see clearly 
for a distance of 50 feet ahead; it was dusk-a time 'when 
lights didn't show up very good'; he first saw the deceased 
just before he struck him, at which time deceased was about 
a foot from his automobile; he (deceased) was moving toward 
the west; from the glimpse he got of deceased, it appeared 
that he was running; defendant turned his automobile to the 
left away from the deceased and applied the brakes, but 
the right front fender of the automobile struck the deceased; 
his automobile came to a stop about 35 feet from the point 
of impact; defendant got out of the automobile and saw the 
deceased lying on the highway 'towards the back end' of the 
automobile and about 12 feet east of it; defendant saw the 
crosswalk before his automobile struck deceased; when his 
automobile struck deceased, the deceased was about 8 feet 
north of the north line of the crosswalk; at the time of the 
accident the deceased was wearing dark clothes. He also 
testified that the intersection 'wasn't lit up enough so that 
you could see anything with respect to this crosswalk that is 
painted across there.' 
"A police officer, who investigated the accident, testified 
that he arrived at the scene of the accident about 7 p. m. 
and took measurements ; the deceased was lying in the 'north-
bound curb lane,' 50 feet north of the north line of the 
crosswalk; there were solid skid marks for a distance of 48 
feet, which skid marks extended from a point 3 feet 'within 
the crosswalk' to the rear wheels of the automobile. 
"Plaintiff's wife testified that when she arrived at the 
scene of the accident the deceased was lying on his side and 
'kind of crm.npled up,' and his shoes were off; that he was 
wearing blue and white striped overalls, a khaki shirt and a 
black hat; his body was removed from the receiving hospital 
to the Paschall Mortuary. 
"Mr. Hilburn testified that he is a licensed embalmer; in 
December, 1948, he was employed as a contract embalmer 
by the Paschall Mortuary; he had with him (at the trial) a 
copy of the Vital Statistics Record; he faintly recalled doing 
some work on the body of the deceased; he took a sample of 
decedent's blood for chemical analysis, as he was required to 
do by the coroner's office; it is a routine procedure, and when 
they take a blood sample they 'put the name of the deceased, 
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the date, and usually the time that the blood sample was 
drawn'-the sample is then turned over to the pathologist, or 
autopsy surgeon. He testified further that his (witness') 
apprentice was with him when he removed the blood from the 
body of the deceased ; he removed the blood on the night of 
December 25, 1948, before the body was embalmed; he (wit-
ness) put the blood in a bottle; he inquired for the name 
of the deceased, and he then put his (deceased's) name on the 
bottle that night by writing it with a pencil on the label 
which was on the bottle; he left the bottle on a shelf in the 
preparation room at the mortuary for the pathologist; there 
was no other bottle there ; there was no other body in the 
mortuary at that time; he had not known the deceased in 
his lifetime, but the owner of the mortuary, Mr. Morgan, had 
told him the body was that of William Nicholsj he had no 
independent 1·ecollection that Mr. Morgan had told him the 
body was that of Mr. William Nichols; the following day Mr. 
Morgan presented a certificate to the witness for him to sign 
as embalmer, and that 'is the case' which he (witness) em-
balmed; the night before, Mr. Morgan had not identified any-
th?:ng to him. He also testified that after embalming is com-
pleted, the bottle is placed on the embalming table with the 
deceased, but he did not recall doing that in this case j he 
may have handed the bottle to his apprentice j he did not see 
the bottle the next day. 
"Dr. Krieger testified that he was the pathologist for the 
county coroner in December, 1948; on December 27, 1948, he 
performed an autopsy on the deceased at the mortuary; and 
that he had notes of the autopsy. He testified further, over 
the objection of plaintiff, that a sample of the blood of the 
deceased was turned over to him (witness)-that according 
to his records he received a blood specimen of the deceased. 
He testified further that the 'blood samples are placed in a 
box and picked up by Mr. Dillard' of the coroner's office and 
taken to the coroner's office for analysis; the bottle in which 
a sample is contained has the identification of the deceased, 
and the result of the examination becomes a part of the 
official public record of the death. On cross-examination he 
testified that he had no recollection of this particular autopsy j 
that he must have picked up a blood sample or he would not 
have stated 'on the specimen' submitted-' Blood for alcohol' j 
according to his notes there was a specirrtenj he (witness) 
did not make any test of the blood itself, and he took no blood 
specimen from the body. 
Feb.1952] NICHOLS v. McCoY 
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"R. J. Abernathy, called as a witness on behalf of defendant, 
testified that he is the chemist and head toxicologist for the 
Coroner of Los Angeles County; he occupied that position in 
December, 1948; in compliance with a subpoena served on 
him, he brought the official county records concerning the 
deceased to court with him; those records are the official 
records of the coroner's office; the records concerning the 
chemical work which is done are kept under his direction and 
supervision. The witness was then asked the following ques-
tion: 'Now, do you have the records concerning your chemical 
analysis of the blood test of WilEam Allen Nichols who met 
his death on Christmas Day in 1948?' He answered, 'I do.' 
Counsel for plaintiff then said, 'Objected to as a conclusion 
of the witness, that it was the blood of William Allen Nichols.' 
The court overruled the objection. The witness was then 
asked whether, under his supervision, a chemical analysis of 
the blood of tne deceased was made. He replied, 'Yes.' He 
was then asked if that analysis revealed the content, i:f any, 
of alcohol in the deceased's blood stream. He replied, 'It did.' 
He was then asked what percentage of alcohol was present 
on examination. He replied, '0.11 per cent.' He testified 
further that the percentage of ethanol level in the blood 
required to produce intoxication in the average person is 
from .10 to .15 per cent. 
"There was also testimony by Dr. Krieger that .15 'milli-
grams per cent' of alcohol in the blood is presumed to be a 
level at which a great many individuals are considered in-
toxicated. 
''The evidence shows that the analysis of the blood was 
made under the supervision of the witness Abernathy. It 
does not appear that he personally made the analysis or that 
he was present when it was made. The person who made the 
analysis under his supervis1:on did not testify and the name 
of that person was not disclosed. Mr. Abernathy's testimony 
as to the alcoholic content of the specimen was based upon a 
record made in the coroner's office. The person who allegedly 
bro·ught the specimen from the Paschall Mortuary to the 
coroner's office did not testify and his name was not disclosed. 
The autopsy was performed at the mortuary two days after 
the accident occurred. The pathologist, who performed the 
autopsy, testified that 'blood samples are placed in a box and 
picked up by Mr. Dillard' and taken to the coroner's office. 
It seems that said testimony was a statement pertaining to 
blood samples generally and the customary procedure of the 
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coroner's office in obtaining the samples, rather than a state-
ment referring particularly to the sample involved herein. 
Mr. Dillard, referred to in that statement, was in the court-
room but he did not testify. Althmtgh the pathologist also 
testified on direct examination that a sample of the blood of 
the deceased was turned over to him, it appears from the 
cross-examination that he had no recollection of this particular 
autopsy, that he d1'd not take a specimen from the body of the 
deceased, and he concluded that he 'must have picked ~tp a 
blood sample' because, according to his notes, there was a 
specimen. The embalmer, who had only a faint recollection 
of having done some work on the body of deceased, testified 
as to the 'routine procedure' in taking a blood sample. He 
also testified that on the night of December 25th, he put the 
blood in a bottle, inquired for the name of the deceased, put 
the name of deceased on a label on the bottle, and left the 
bottle on a shelf in the preparation room for the pathologist ; 
and no other bottle was there. It is to be noted that he also 
testified that after embalming is completed the bottle contain-
ing the sample is placed on the embalming table with the 
deceased, but he did not recall doing that in this case; that 
he may have handed the bottle to his apprentice. It thus 
appears that he dicl not remember whether he put the bottle 
on a shelf or on the embalming table, or whether he handed 
it to his apprentice. He also testified that no othe1· body was 
in the mortnar·y at that time. It does not appear, however, 
that other bodies were not ther·e later that night or at some 
time dur1:ng the next two days which elapsed before the path-
ologist arrived and performed the atttopsy. No bottle or label 
purporting to be the bottle or label referred to herein was 
prod1wed in cottrt. There was no evidence as to when or how or 
by whom the specimen of blood involved here was taken from 
the modnary to the coroner·'s office; and there was no evi-
dence as to the appearance or condition of the bottle or label 
at the time the specimen was taken from the mortuary or at 
the t·1:me it was received at the coroner's office. It thus appears 
that the various steps in the keeping and the transportation 
of the specimen of Mr. Nichols' blood, from the time the 
specimen was taken from his body to the time it was analyzed 
by Mr. Abernathy, were not traced or shown by the evidence. 
The blood specimen which was analyzed, and concerning which 
M~r. Abernathy testified, was not identified as the blood of 
Mr. Nichols. 
"Respondent asserts that it must be presumed that offi-
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cial duty was performed properly and that the public records 
of the coroner's office are correct. In the case of McGowan 
v. City of Los Angeles, 100 Cal.App.2d 386 [223 P.2d 862, 
863], a toxicologist, employed in the coroner's office in charge 
of the examination of blood of deceased persons, testified that 
a paper entitled 'Blood alcohol determination' was made by 
his department in the regular course of business; that the 
death of Charles Cox >vas recorded; that the record indicated 
that the blood that was examined came in a bottle from a 
certain mortuary; that on the bottle there was the name of 
Charles Cox and the name of the mortuary; and that the 
analysis was noted on the paper. An assistant toxicologist, 
employed in the coroner's office, testified therein that she 
received the bottle, examined the blood and prepared the 
said paper. Defendant therein contended that the court 
erred in refusing to admit the paper in evidence, and relied 
upon the provisions of section 1920 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure. Section 1920 provides: 'Entries in public or 
other official books or records, made in the performance of 
his duty by a public officer of this state, or by another person 
in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are 
prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.' In that 
case the court said, 100 Cal.App.2d at page 389, 223 P.2d at 
page 864: 'If it had been proved that the blood analyzed by 
the county coroner's office had been taken from the body of 
Cox before any extraneous matter had been injected into his 
body, the coroner's record of the analysis would have been 
admissible and prima facie evidence of the facts therein 
stated.' It was also said therein, 100 Cal.App.2d at page 
390, 223 P.2d at page 864: ' ... the record of the analysis 
of blood in the present case without tracing the blood to the 
body of Cox was not admissible.' It was also stated therein, 
100 Cal.App.2d at page. 392, 223 P.2d at page 866: 'The 
statute does not change the rules of competency or relevancy 
with respect to recorded facts. It does not make that proof 
which is not proof. It merely provides a method of proof of 
an admissible ''act, condition or event.'' . . . In the absence 
of proof that the blood analyzed was the blood of Cox, taken 
from his body prior to the injection of any fluid therein, oral 
testimony of the result of the analysis would not be ad-
missible.' It was also said therein on the same page : 'There 
was no evidence that any blood was ever taken from the body 
of Cox, or, if any was taken, the identity of the person who 
took it, or when it was taken- ... how, when, and the 
458 HALE v. BoHANNON [38 C.2d 
identity of the person by whom the container was labeled, or 
who delivered the bottle to the coroner's office, or that the 
blood analyzed was that of Cox. Neither the label nor the 
bottle was identified, offered or received in evidence. No 
excuse, explanation or justification was given for failure to 
lay the necessary foundation. The court did not err in re-
fusing to admit the paper in evidence.' In the present case, 
since the specimen of blood was not identified as the blood of 
Mr. Nichols, the court erred prejudicially in receiving the 
testimony as to the analysis of the specimen.'' 
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgment. 
[Sac. No. 6096. In Bank. Feb. 21, 1952.] 
ROY L. HALE, Respondent, v. DAVID D. BOHANNON 
et al., Defendants; DOLLY VARDEN LUMBER 
COMPANY (a Corporation), Appellant. 
[1] Evidence-Extrinsic Evidence-Nature of Rule.-Parol evi-
dence rule is not a rule of evidence, but is one of substantive 
law. 
[2] Id.- Extrinsic Evidence- Nature of Rule.- Parol evidence 
rule as applied to contracts is simply that, as a matter of 
substantive law, the act of embodying the complete terms of 
an agreement in a writing becomes the contract of the parties. 
[3] Frauds, Statute of-Operation of Statute.-Where a contract 
is oral, but for purposes of the statute of frauds, has been 
confirmed by written memorandum, the oral contract governs 
and the writing, which does not purport to be an integration, 
serves only to prevent the contract from being unenforceable. 
[4] Venue-Appeal.-\7\There a motion for change of venue is made 
and determined on allegations of a verified complaint and 
affidavits of the respective parties, 'all conflicts must be resolved 
in favor of the prevailing party, and all reasonable inferences 
which are to be drawn must be in support of the order. 
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